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Abstract 
The present study expands recent cross-sectional crisis response research identifying eight distinctive 
crisis response strategies (Diers, 2009) emerging from more than 40 individual tactics identified by 
predominantly case-study research in crisis communication (see, e.g., Benoit, 2004; Mohamed, Gardner, 
& Paolillo, 1999). This research tested previous findings industry and crisis type as critical factors 
affecting the selection of crisis response strategies by organizations in their public statements following a 
crisis. However, it also expands previous research by evaluating the effects of a corporation’s nation of 
origin, comparing social media versus traditional media as channels of engagement, and time in the crisis 
development as potential factors also affecting an organization’s crisis response.  
Therefore, this study followed eleven organizations in five industries from five different nations facing 
three distinctive types of crises over a period of eight weeks analyzing messages in press releases, social 
media (e.g., Facebook and Twitter), and traditional media (i.e., print and broadcast). Findings largely 
support previous research on the emergence of distinctive crisis response strategies and demonstrate the 
importance of considering industry, crisis type, nation, channel, and time as critical factors affecting the 
strategic response to crises.  
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Crisis Response Today 
When written in Chinese the word "crisis" is composed of two characters - one represents danger and the 
other represents opportunity.  ~John F. Kennedy, address, 12 April 1959 
 
For much of the last decade the news across the West has been dominated by crises—news of wars, 
corruption and misdeeds by business and government officials alike, natural disasters, and a global 
economic crisis as the most notable examples. There has been much case study work addressing corporate 
accidents and reputational crises (Carroll, 2009), natural disasters (e.g., Benoit & Henson, 2009; Berger, 
2009), as well as issue management (de Brooks & Waymer, 2009) to name just a few. Taken together, we 
believe the next step for the study of crisis response strategies is to focus on how tactics combine into 
public relations/ public affairs responses to situations over across the crisis’s emergence and life so that we 
can more meaningfully construct and test models of effective crisis response discourse. Though this 
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challenge for analyzing critical variables together has been out for over a decade (Coombs & Holladay, 
2002; 1996), there remains a dearth of research addressing these issues (Coombs, 2007).  
Additionally, very little crisis response research has addressed the role that the organization’s nation of 
origin might have on the crisis response messages created and disseminated—despite arguments and 
analysis indicating that in an increasingly global world conflict and crises within a nation can have 
transnational implications (Molleda, Connolly-Ahern, & Quinn, 2005; Moore, 2004). Analysis that, given the 
current global financial crisis, natural disasters, and accidents dominating the headlines, suggests that our 
organizations are not longer just speaking to audiences within their own countries—or the countries where 
they are conducting their business, but must also engage global stakeholders. This is only amplified by the 
use of the Internet (Krishnamurthy & Kucuk, 2009). Yet, expanding our fields of interest in the nation 
studied has functionally meant moving our case studies from those of American corporations (Greer & 
Moreland, 2003) to case studies in other nations (Chen, 2009). Though these studies have afforded us 
useful information, they do not actually compare cross-national responses to crises.  
Therefore, the goal of this study is to build on previous research identifying strategies (Diers, 2009) 
emerging from tactics to test the veracity of those strategies as well as to evaluate the role that nation, 
channel, and time have on the use of crisis response strategies. In so doing, this study paper reviews key 
variables, describes the data collection and analysis methods, reports the results, and discusses both the 
practical and theoretical implications of this research.  
 
Literature Review 
When well-managed, organizational crises can serve a number of functions for an organization, but every 
crisis also presents an array of risks for organizations. For example, organizational crises can lead to more 
effective organizational learning (Chen, 2009; Roux-Dufort, 2000), they can help point out areas of an 
organization’s culture that have to change because it is detrimental to the organization’s capabilities (Ross 
& Benson, 1995), and crises can point out systemic flaws in organizations’ abilities (Argenti, 2002; Benoit & 
Henson, 2009; Greer & Moreland, 2003). However, organizational crises—by their very nature—also 
represent a credible threat to an organization’s well-being (Carroll, 2009; Hayes & Patton, 2001; Pearson & 
Clair, 1998). For example, these threats can include conflicts between the needs of shareholders and 
victims of accidents (Marcus & Goodman, 1991), damage to the organization’s image (Elsbach, Sutton, & 
Principe, 1998), or they can even jeopardize the livelihood of an organization (King, 2002). 
Yet clearly, organizations—especially those in crisis—do not exist in a vacuum. Context, situation, and 
environment are critical components for organizations coping with day-to-day business, let alone crises 
(Coombs, 2007). Environments are dynamic, not dependable, nor particularly stable because they are 
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changed by what organizations do and how people perceive their environment (Sutcliffe, 2001; Trice & 
Beyer, 1993). Negotiation of the environment, the variance in situations, and potential for both similarity 
and difference in crisis experience is at the heart of the argument that a thorough understanding of the 
features affecting a crisis situation can help us better understand organizational crises, communication, and 
outcomes (Seeger, 2002). 
 
Industry 
One such component of the context is the industry to which an organization belongs. Industry has long 
been posited as a factor that would likely influence an organization’s reaction to crises (e.g., Arpan, 2002; 
deBrooks & Waymer, 2009; Glynn, 2000; Millar, 2004). Previous research addressing organization type and 
crisis response has three central findings. First, niches and sectors are likely to influence organizational 
reactions to crises (Arpan, 2002; deBrooks & Waymer, 2009; Massey, 2001; Millar, 2004). Second, the type 
of work an organization performs, its routines, and multiple dimensions of that organization’s identity can 
often place restraints on an organization’s responses to crises (Ginzel, et al., 1993; Glynn, 2000). Third, 
industries are meaningful ways to group organizations the similarities shared by those organizations should 
reflect similar functions and communicative needs (Bureau, 2002; Glynn, 2000).  
Because of this foundation research, organization type or industry was tested in Diers’ (2009) research and 
found to be a significant factor in predicting the crisis response strategies that an organization would use. 
However, the strength of this effect was not as strong as previous research indicated that it should be. One 
explanation is certainly that there may be less industry conformity than previous researchers might have 
believed. However, in evaluating the study design it seems more likely that the breadth of Diers (2009) 
study—evaluating 18 different industries with a total of 133 unique crises and only 399 messages total—
indicates that there may not have been sufficient data to effectively test each of those 18 industries. This 
suggests that in a deeper cross-industry analysis would likely yield a stronger result for the role that 
industry would have on an organizations crisis response strategy. Therefore, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The industry of an organization in crisis will affect its approach to crisis response.  
 
Crisis Type 
Several authors (e.g., Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 1996; 2002; Hearit, 1999; Pearson & Mitroff, 
1993; Seeger, 2002) argue that the context for a crisis is of vital importance in determining appropriate 
organizational responses. Table 1 identifies a typology of crises that organizations are likely to face, based 
on those identified across the crisis communication literature and drawing heavily from a typology that 
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Coombs and Holladay (2002) created and that Coombs (2007) argues represents victim, accidental, and 
preventable clusters. Yet these previous groupings of crises are not comprehensive and mix situations 
where the organization would likely be at fault versus not at fault as well as situations that cannot be 
controlled with those that can be more readily managed. We believe that the typology discussed here offers 
a more clear, testable, and robust heuristic.  
 
Table 1  
Types of Crises 
Crisis Category Crisis Type Definition/Example Key Author(s) 
Organizational 
Transgressions 
Illegal Corporate 
Behavior 
Intentional or unintentional activities of an agent or 
organization, done for the organization’s benefit. 
Examples: conspiring to fix prices, antitrust 
violations, disparate treatment involving 
discrimination, patent infringement, securities fraud 
Baucus & Baucus 
(1997), Coombs & 
Holladay (2002), 
Hearit (1999), Pearson 
& Clair (1998) 
 Technical 
Breakdown 
Accident 
Accident caused by technology or equipment failure. 
Example: airline crashes 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 
Marcus & Goodman 
(1991)  
 Technical 
Breakdown 
Product Recall 
Recall of a product because of technical or 
equipment failure 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 
Marcus & Goodman 
(1991), Pearson & 
Clair (1998) 
 Megadamage A technical breakdown accident that produces 
significant environmental damage. Example: the 
Exxon Valdez crash 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Pearson & 
Clair (1998) 
 Human 
Breakdown 
Accident 
Industrial accident caused by human error. Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 
Marcus & Goodman 
(1991) 
 Human 
Breakdown Recall 
Product recall that is a result of human error. Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 
Marcus & Goodman 
(1991), Pearson & 
Clair (1998) 
 Organizational 
Misdeed with No 
Injuries 
Occurs when management knowingly deceives 
stakeholders, but no injury results to stakeholders. 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 
Marcus & Goodman 
(1991) 
 Organizational 
Misdeed with 
Injuries 
Occurs when management knowingly places some 
stakeholders at risk and some are injured and/or 
killed. 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Hearit (1999), 
Marcus & Goodman 
(1991) 
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Table 1 Continued 
Organizational 
Events 
Mergers and 
Failed 
Mergers 
Combination (or failure to) combine, to some degree, with 
another organization.  
Basham (2001), King 
(2002) 
 Strikes The stoppage or threat to stop work at an organization by 
a union or group of workers with specific goals of 
negotiation with management 
Gonzales-Hererro & 
Pratt (1998) 
 Economic 
Downturns 
Resulting in 
Organizational 
Action 
Examples: downsizing or layoffs Basham (2001); King 
(2002) 
 Workplace 
Violence 
Attacks on the job by organizational members or former 
members resulting in violence. Examples: Post Office 
Shootings, Columbine, Sexual Harassment 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Pearson & 
Clair (1998) 
Events/ 
Actions 
Outside of 
Organizations 
Locus of 
Control 
Rumor The circulation of false information designed to hurt the 
organization. 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), King (2002); 
Pearson & Clair (1998) 
 Malevolence/ 
Product 
Tampering 
Damage of products or services by an external agent that 
harms the organization 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Pearson & 
Clair (1998) 
 Challenge Confrontation by disgruntled stakeholders claiming the 
organization has acted wrongly. Examples: Pressure Group 
Activism, Boycotts 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Heath (1996), 
Pearson & Clair (1998) 
 Shifting 
Political 
Attitudes 
As the political attitudes change products, services, 
company ideals, etc. become less desirable to stakeholders 
Basham (2001) 
 Natural 
Disasters 
Naturally occurring event that harms the organization 
and/or its stakeholders. Examples: Tornado, Earthquake 
Basham (2001), 
Coombs & Holladay 
(2002), Gonzales-
Herrero & Pratt 
(1998), Pearson & 
Clair (1998) 
 Terrorist 
Attack 
Actions by an outside agent with an array of impacts from 
loss of stakeholders, employees, infrastructure, collapses 
in demand, significant secondary effects (e.g., customer 
service, breakdowns in transportation and communication) 
Argenti (2002), 
Gonzales-Herrero & 
Pratt (1998), Pearson 
& Clair (1998) 
 
Previous research addressing crisis type and strategic crisis response has three central findings. First, crises 
range in magnitude from small internal issues with few potential effects to those whose magnitude can 
affect the environment, millions of lives, and an organization’s survival (e.g., Hearit, 1999; Malone & 
Coombs, 2009; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993). Second, the type of crisis is a vital determinant of an 
organization’s response (Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Holladay, 2002). Third, crisis types include: 
organizational transgressions (i.e., blame can be attributed to the organization, regardless of the 
organization’s intent); organizational events (incidents either in or outside of the organization’s locus of 
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control but that emerge as crises); and external events leading to crises (such crises are entirely outside of 
an organization’s control, but still represent an image risk to the organization).  
Diers’ (2009) tested previous predictions about the role of crisis type (see Coombs & Holladay, 1996) on 
crisis response strategies finding there were strong indications that crisis type influences the selection of 
strategies. Diers found that contrary to previous assumptions (see, e.g., Coombs & Holladay, 1996), during 
organizational transgressions instead of employing image-oriented strategies, organizations were more 
likely to employ a defensive strategy (see Table 2) incorporating elements of anti-social or defensive, 
accommodative, and framing the crisis tactics (see Table 3).  
Diers’ (2009) research did, however, largely confirm previous predictions regarding organizational events 
finding that during these crises organizations were most likely to use explanative and offensive (see Table 
2) strategies combining framing the crisis, framing the organization, anti-social or defensive, excellence, 
and invoking interorganizational relationships as tactics most typically. Though confirming previous research, 
in finding the substantial use of excellence and invoking interorganizational relationships as tactics, this 
research added to our understanding of organizational events.  
 
Table 2  
Crisis Response Message Strategies 
Strategy Definition Tactics Included Predictors of 
Strategy 
Future-Oriented CRSs emphasize moving forward, even to 
the point of avoiding discussing present 
circumstances, present situation, or practices 
Self-Enhancement, 
Excellence/ Renewal, 
&/or IOR’s 
Crisis Prone 
Organizations 
Present-Oriented CRSs emphasize tackling the crisis directly—
talking about the organization’s role and/or 
actions taken 
Framing the Crisis, 
Framing the 
Organization, Anti-
Social/Defensive, 
Accommodative, IOR’s 
Non-Crisis Prone 
Organizations 
Aggressive CRSs tell stakeholders what is (not) 
occurring and actively involves being 
defensive about organization’s role or 
culpability 
Framing the Crisis, 
Anti-Social/ Defensive 
Utility Industry, 
Information Industry, 
Arts/ Entertainment/ 
Recreation Industry, 
Events Outside the 
Organization’s 
Control, 
Organizational 
Transgressions1 
Defensive CRSs emphasize denying or minimizing the 
organization’s culpability or role, but also 
actively involves efforts to increase 
organization’s image 
Anti-Social/ Defensive, 
Accommodative 
Manufacturing 
Industry, 
Administrative 
Support & Waste 
Remediation Industry, 
Organizational 
Transgressions 
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Table 2 Continued 
Explanative CRSs endeavor to create good will while 
explaining the crisis—characterized by 
openness, engagement, and an appearance 
that the organization is sympathetic to the 
situation 
Framing the Crisis, 
Accommodative 
Accommodation 
Industry, Finance/ 
Insurance, 
Organizational Events, 
Organizational 
Transgressions1 
Offensive CRSs endeavor to create many possibilities 
to appeal to many different stakeholder 
groups by including a variety of strategies in 
a single message 
Any of the strategies in 
combination with three 
or more prominent 
strategies in the 
message 
Transportation & 
Warehousing, Health 
& Social Assistance, 
Public Administration, 
Organizational 
Transgressions, 
Organizational Events 
Single Tactic Simple CRSs emphasizing only a single tactic 
in the message. 
Any of the tactics Professional/ 
Scientific/ 
Technological 
Industry, 
Management of 
Companies Industry, 
Educational Services 
Industry, Mining 
Industry, Construction 
Industry, Retail Trade 
Industry, Agriculture/ 
Forestry/ Hunting/ 
Fishing Industry, 
Wholesale Trade 
 
Finally, with regard to events outside the organization’s control, Diers’ (2009) research only partially 
supported previous research that organizations would frame the crisis, frame the organization, and use 
anti-social or defensive tactics most (Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Instead, Diers found that during these 
events organizations would use a more aggressive strategy (see Table 2), framing the crisis, incorporating 
anti-social or defensive tactics, and incorporate routine communication efforts (see Table 3) most often.  
 
Table 3 
Taxonomy of Crisis Response Tactics Potentially Used By Organizations 
Strategy Category Strategy 
 
Strategy Description Example Key Author(s) 
Self-Enhancement Marketing Emphasizing product quality, prices, 
safety, promotions 
Heath (1994), Proto & Supino 
(1999), Scott & Lane (2000) 
 Image Advertising Providing information to make the 
organization look positive. Framing 
an issue for the stakeholders 
Heath (1994; 1998), Scott & 
Lane (2000) 
Routine 
Communication 
Communication of 
Mission/ Vision 
Communication emphasizing 
organizational goals/ mentioning 
mission/ vision 
Heath (1994) 
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Table 3 Continued 
 Annual Reports Report monetary assets, liabilities, 
future liabilities, interest in 
cooperation to increase market value 
Heath (1994), Proto & Supino 
(1999) 
 Newsletters Report monetary gains, attention to 
stakeholder concerns 
Fiol (1995), Heath (1994), 
Proto & Supino (1999) 
Framing the Crisis Accounts Development of dominant narrative, 
use of narrative to explain the 
problem 
Kauffman (2001), Massey 
(2001), Mohamed, et al. 
(1999) 
 Information 
Dissemination 
Delivering information regarding the 
issue to educate, often with the goal 
of increasing stakeholder sense of 
empowerment 
Martinelli & Briggs (1998), 
Rowan (1996), Sellnow 
(1993), Slovic (1987)  
 Issue Salience Communicating importance, often 
uses risk or fright factors and/or 
scientific discourse 
Bennett (1998), Sellnow 
(1993), Slovic (1987), 
Williams & Olaniran (1998) 
 Preconditioning Influencing stakeholders to the 
organization’s position on a crisis and 
their opinions about the organization 
by: downplaying damage, putting act 
in a more favorable context, or 
attacking accusers 
Benoit (2004; 1997), Sturges 
(1994) 
Framing the 
Organization 
Ingratiation Efforts to create positive image by 
reminding stakeholders of past good 
works or qualities 
Coombs & Schmidt (2000) 
 Organizational 
Promotion 
Presenting the organization as being 
highly competent, effective, 
successful 
Marra (1998), Mohamed, et 
al. (1999) 
 Issue Management Issue diagnosis, advocacy advertising  Cheney & Christensen 
(2001), Gonzales-Herrero & 
Pratt (1998), Hayes & Patton 
(2001)  
 Supplication Portraying the organization as 
dependent on others in effort to 
solicit assistance 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
 Organizational 
Handicapping 
Making task success appear unlikely 
in order to have ready-made case for 
failure 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
 Bolstering An effort to separate the organization 
from the crisis by emphasizing past 
accomplishments, stress good traits 
Benoit & Czerwinski (1997), 
Benoit (2004), Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000), Kauffman 
(2001), Sellnow & Brand 
(2001) 
Anti-social or 
Defensive 
Noncompliance The organization cannot/ does not 
choose to act 
Henriques & Sadorsky (1999) 
 Disclaimers Explanations given prior to an action 
that might be embarrassing to ward 
off negative implications to image 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
 Defensive 
Compliance 
Indicating that actions are driven by 
compliance or requirements 
Henriques & Sadorsky (1999) 
 Evasion of 
Responsibility 
De-emphasizing role in blame by: 
emphasizing lack of control over 
events; emphasizing accident; or 
emphasizing good intentions 
Benoit (2004; 1997), Benoit & 
Czerwinski (1997), Coombs & 
Holladay (2002), Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000), Henderson 
(2003), Ray (1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observatorio (OBS*) Journal, (2010)          Audra R Diers, Kathryn Tomaino 
 
029
 
Table 3 Continued 
 Shifting the Blame The most defensive strategy—
shifting or minimizing responsibility 
for fault 
Benoit (2004), Benoit (1997), 
Coombs & Holladay (2002), 
Coombs & Schmidt (2000), 
Ray (1999) 
 Simple Denial The organization did not perform the 
act 
Benoit & Czerwinski (1997), 
Benoit (2004), Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000) 
 Strategic Ambiguity Not releasing many details, able to 
keep stories consistent 
Sellnow & Ulmer (1995), 
Ulmer & Sellnow (2000), 
Sellnow & Ulmer (2004)  
 Intimidation Representing the organization as 
powerful or dangerous, willing and able 
to adversely affect those who oppose 
its efforts 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
 Minimization Emphasizing act or event not serious Benoit (2004: 1997), Benoit 
& Czerwinski (1997), Coombs 
& Schmidt (2000) 
 Transcendence Emphasizing more important 
considerations 
Benoit & Czerwinski (1997); 
Benoit (2004) 
Accommodative Corrective Action/ 
Compensation 
Effort to ‘correct’ actions adversely 
affecting others. Can include 
announcements of recall or offers of 
compensation 
Benoit (2004; 1997), Benoit 
& Czerwinski (1997), Coombs 
& Holladay (2002), Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000), Henderson 
(2003), Martinelli & Briggs 
(1998), Mohamed, et al. 
(1999), Ray (1999) 
 Apologia Communication of contrition, 
admission of blame including remorse 
and requests for pardon, mortification 
Benoit (2004; 1997), Benoit 
& Czerwinski (1997), Coombs 
& Holladay (2002), Coombs & 
Schmidt (2000), Hearit 
(1999), Henderson (2003), 
Martinelli & Briggs (1998), 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
Accommodative 
(continued) 
Compassion Communication of concern over well-
being/ safety of public; helping people 
psychologically cope with crisis 
Martinelli & Briggs (1998), 
Mohamed et al.,  (1999), 
Sturges (1994) 
 Offering 
Reassurances 
‘This will never happen again…’ 
Assertions that problems are corrected 
Henderson (2003) 
 Eliciting Sympathy Asking stakeholders to feel sorry for 
the organization because of what 
happened 
Ray (1999) 
 Transparency Emphasizing complete compliance, 
openness to inquiry, requesting 
information seeking 
Greer & Moreland (2003), 
Kauffman (2001), Sellnow & 
Seeger (2001), Sellnow & 
Ulmer (1995), Williams & 
Olaniran (1998) 
 Volunteering Seeking stakeholder involvement with 
the organization as a means of 
resolving the crisis 
Gregory (2000) 
Excellence/ 
Renewal  
Dialogic Emphasizing openness and willingness 
to engage about the issue 
Das & Teng (1998), Milliman, 
et al. (1994), Nielson & 
Bartenuk (1996), Williams & 
Olaniran (1998) 
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Table 3 Continued 
 Exemplification Portraying the organization as having 
integrity, social responsibility, moral 
worthiness 
Benoit & Czerwinski (1997), 
Henriques & Sadorsky 
(1999), Marra (1998) 
 Pro-social Behavior Engaging in actions to atone for 
transgression and persuade 
stakeholders of positive identity 
Mohamed, et al. (1999), 
Sellnow & Brand (2001)  
Interorganizational 
Relationships 
Blaring Others Identifying negative link to undesirable 
other 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
 Blasting Exaggerating negative features of an 
undesirable other 
Mohamed, et al. (1999), 
Sellnow & Brand (2001) 
 Burying Obscuring or disclaiming a positive link 
to an undesirable other 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
 Blurring Obscuring or disclaiming a negative 
link to a favorable other 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
 Belittling Minimizing traits or accomplishments 
of a negatively linked other, attacking 
accuser’s credibility 
Benoit & Czerwinski (1997),  
Coombs & Schmidt (2000), 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
 Boosting Minimizing undesirable features of a 
positively linked other 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
 Boasting Proclaiming a positive link to a 
desirable other 
Mohamedet al.,  (1999) 
 Burnishing Enhancing desirable features of a 
positively linked other 
Mohamed, et al. (1999) 
 Collaboration Emphasizing desire to change and 
work with another organization to 
resolve the crisis 
Henriques & Sadorsky 
(1999), Martinelli & Briggs 
(1998), Milliman, et al. 
(1994) 
 
Taken together, though these findings were strong, the formation of these strategies was a new 
contribution to our understanding of crisis response and must be tested to identify the degree to which 
they are valid. As such, we propose: 
Hypothesis 2: Organizations facing transgressions will most typically employ tactics that reflect a 
defensive strategy (i.e., anti-social or defensive, accommodative, and framing the crisis tactics).  
Hypothesis 3: Organizations facing organizational events will most typically employ tactics that reflect 
explanative and offensive strategies (i.e., framing the crisis, framing the organization, anti-social or 
defensive, excellence, and invoke interorganizational relationship tactics).  
Hypothesis 4: Organizations facing events outside the organization’s control will most typically employ 
tactics that reflect an aggressive strategy (i.e., framing the crisis, anti-social or defensive, and routine 
communication tactics).  
 
Nation 
In recent years, there has been an increased recognition that national identity matters in crisis response. 
For example, Chen’s (2009) analysis of the effects of institutionalizing public relations and strategic 
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identified different degrees to which public relations was institutionalized in Europe, the United States, and 
China as the entrée to the conversation. Further, Molleda, et al.’s (2005) analysis focusing on the 
expanding theories of global public relations based on the assumption that crises are not contained within a 
nation’s borders, but have international implications could not have been more clearly demonstrated than 
the economic collapse based in issues within the American market. Additionally, even regional distinctions 
(i.e., Europe) have been problematized with research comparing the representation of key events of 
European debate identifying critical differences in the construction of narratives and symbolism between 
European nations (Rovisco, 2010). This suggests that we must look beyond analyses of single nations to 
understand crisis response in a global communication environment, which supports Marra’s (1998) analysis 
that culture and crisis communication are inextricably linked from the decisions about what to communicate 
to the content of the messages communicated. Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 5: An organization’s nation of origin will influence its approach to crisis response.  
 
Channel 
In 2009, when information about the protests of the Iranian Presidential election reached the outside of 
that nation’s borders, they were seen through the eyes of camera phones, social media, and blogs. The 
reality of a “Web 2.0” world is undeniable—Moore (2004) argues that the Internet and mediated forms of 
crisis communication represent a collaborative platform to manage both crises and their surrounding issues. 
Analysts argue that the Internet and other mediated forms of crisis communication are effective channels 
during crises because: (a) they are widely available; (b) they are easily updated, enabling timely responses; 
(c) the content is flexible so that the organization can communicate compassion to victims while helping the 
organization to communicate to the public as well as the media; and (d) they are inexpensive to maintain 
(Greer & Moreland, 2003).  
Ultimately, a majority of organizations have turned to the Internet to communicate with stakeholders 
during a crisis (Perry et al., 2003). However, the same study also found that while the use of the Internet is 
increasing as a channel for crisis messages, organizations continued to prefer traditional methods of crisis 
communication. Part of this reason is because during disasters or very large organizational crises, 
organizations use the mass media to communicate with their stakeholders, suggesting that the media can 
be a target audience as well as a channel of communication that can enhance the credibility of an 
organization’s crisis response strategy (Argenti, 2002; Benoit and Czerwinski, 1997; Henderson 2003). 
These findings suggest that there is a strong link between channel of communication crisis response 
strategy, but also suggest that there might be differences in the ways in which organizations engage new 
and traditional media in their crisis communication. Therefore, we propose:  
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Hypothesis 6: Organizational response strategies will differ between those messages sent via new and 
traditional media channels.  
 
Timing Response Strategies 
In their work, Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt (1996) emphasize that it is not enough to examine critical 
situational factors; they argue it is also important to examine crisis lifecycles because in different stages of 
a crisis different communicative needs and strategies are likely to emerge. Further, Massey (2001) argues 
that research on crisis communication should be a longitudinal endeavor because crises are not static 
events also suggesting that communicative needs and strategies are likely to change over the course of a 
crisis.  
Gonzales-Herrero and Pratt (1996) argue that during crises, communicative efforts are designed to handle 
the media, develop crisis materials (i.e., position statements, frequently asked question responses, preempt 
negative publicity, communicate with stakeholders). This suggests that the options and possible 
communicative choices during the crisis are almost limitless (Heath & Millar, 2004). However, they also 
argue that these messages will differ from those late in a crisis as organizations continue to monitor the 
issue, focus on corrective action, moving forward from the crisis, and rebuilding the organization’s image. 
Essentially, late and post-crisis communication should demonstrate how the organization has changed, how 
it will prevent negative situations in the future, and how it has engaged the issue (Heath & Millar, 2004; 
Malone & Coombs, 2009). Though these recommendations are broad with some overlap, they do strongly 
suggest that over a crisis’s life, there are likely to be differences in the messages communicating shifting 
from early accounts to post crisis image recovery. As such, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 7: Over time in a crisis, there will be changes in organizations’ crisis response strategies.  
 
Crisis Response Strategies 
Though we have been somewhat critical of single-organization case studies, this research has laid valuable 
groundwork for developing our understanding of crisis communication in the identification and discussion of 
more than 40 unique tactics (see Table 3). Additionally, this body of research contributes with comparisons 
of crisis response tactics used in single crises with single organizations; such as Benoit and Henson’s (2009) 
analysis of President Bush’s image repair discourse after Hurricane Katrina or Sellnow and Ulmer’s (1995) 
analysis of message ambiguity in the Jack in the Box E. Coli crisis. In his work, Coombs (2007) asserts that 
no perfect list of crisis response strategies is perfect, but that his Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
demands a link between crisis situations and response stratgies. Yet, in his conceptualization of response 
strategies he only addresses 11 tactics in two strategies that are argumentatively (versus directly tested) 
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derived. This suggests, that while a perfect list may not exist nor be possible, we can do much more to 
connect and evaluate strategies organizations use to respond to crises. Diers (2009) research made a very 
strong contribution in identifying eight strategies based on these individual tactics (see Table 2). However, 
these initial findings should be tested to identify the strength of those previous classifications of strategies 
as well as identify if any new strategies are likely to emerge. For these classifications to be valid, they 
cannot merely be useful descriptors at one point in time, they must translate across time and context. 
Therefore, we propose the following questions: 
Research Question 1: To what extent are the eight strategies previously identified (Diers, 2009) 
verifiable in new data samples? 
Research Question 2: Are there additional strategies that emerge based on new situational stressors? 
 
Methods 
In the context of organizational crises and crisis response tactics, quantitative content analysis is a strong 
method to employ, particularly when selecting messages presented in both new and traditional public 
media outlets (Molleda, Connolly-Ahern, & Quinn, 2005). These media are also important because an 
organization’s image is likely shaped through a combination of media sources, in particular when those 
events involve the combination of corporate profit, government interest, and/or public risk (Andsager & 
Smiley, 1998; Krishnamurthy & Kucuk, 2009; Malecha & Reagan, 2004).  
Consequently, analyzing traditional and new media sources that includes crisis responses from the 
organization is a valuable and strategically grounded method for analyzing the proposed research questions 
and hypotheses(see, e.g., Andsager & Smiley, 1998; Molleda, et al., 2005). Therefore, the present study 
involves a 5 (industry) x 5 (nation) x 3 (crisis type) x 2 (channel) x time content analysis design. 
 
The Study Sample 
Beginning in January, 2010 a research team of 14 identified organizational crises viable for this study based 
on the following criteria: (a) each crisis had to be judged as substantial enough to receive news coverage 
and organizational attention for the following eight weeks of data collection; (b) each had to be relevant at 
the time of data collection so that new media information would be readily available; and (c) at least two 
organizations from the same industry but different nations had to be identified. For the eight-week period 
from late January, 2010 into late March, 2010 the research team gathered data from any available new 
media sources the organization or its official representative(s) used (i.e., the organization’s website, blog, 
Twitter feeds, Facebook, and YouTube videos). Additionally, the team used Lexis/NexisTM to identify 
traditional media stories including official statements from the organization because effective precedent and 
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procedure for its use has been established in studies analyzing crisis communication (see Andsager & 
Smiley, 1998; Molleda, et al., 2005; Perry, Taylor, & Doerfel, 2003). Additionally, available advertisements 
addressing the crisis were used. The team’s goal was to identify an exhaustive group of unique statements 
from official organizational representatives across new and traditional media sources. The result was eleven 
unique crises in five different industries from five different nations with 607 unique messages to analyze.  
For organizational transgressions, the team focused on misdeeds with injuries including accusations against 
The Who’s Peter Townshend for child pornography emerging before their Super Bowl performance and 
Toyota’s series of recalls. For organizational events, economic downturns have dominated the news since 
2008; therefore this study included, professional sports teams’ financial struggles with Portsmouth Football 
Club’s debt crisis and the WBNA’s financial struggles; Canwest and Morris Publishing’s financial struggles; 
and the automobile manufacturing industries financial struggles with Porsche and General Motors. Finally, 
for events outside the organization’s control our study began the same week as the devastating Haiti 
earthquake; therefore, the independent humanitarian organizations with the British and American Red 
Cross’s crisis response strategies were included.  
 
Coding Scheme 
A unit of analysis was operationalized as a single news story (press release, Twitter post, unique Facebook 
post, etc.) because previous studies of crisis response messages (e.g., Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997; Elsbach, 
1994; Greer & Moreland, 2003; Genderson, 2003, Kauffman, 2001) emphasize that when studying crisis 
communication, examining the interplay of tactics employed affords researchers more information about an 
organization’s strategy.  
Eleven team members—all of whom were unfamiliar with previous research—coded the entirety of one 
organization’s crisis response messages. Each team member received a 50 minute group coding training 
with similar data using the coding scheme. Following procedures to establish intercoder reliability used by 
Molleda, et al. (2005), 10 percent of the sample was randomly selected and independently coded by 
another member of the research team. An overall intercoder reliability analysis was conducted finding the 
coding scheme to be reliable ( = .89). The coding scheme is based on manifest content, for each variable, 
with the operationalization reflected in Tables 1 and 3. Evidence of the presence of each crisis response 
tactic was coded as binary data with its presence or “not presence” noted.  
 
Analysis Methods 
In order to address research questions one and two, a correlation was performed to identify relationships 
between crisis response tactics employed. Based on the results of this correlation, significant positive 
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correlations were analyzed as factors in order to test both differences in tactics and strategies to test the 
hypotheses. Because binary data can mathematically function as scale for Hypotheses one through six, 
ANOVA tests were run—first testing for interaction effects and where there were no interaction effects 
testing for main effects with a Scheffe post-hoc to identify homogeneous subsets. To test Hypothesis seven, 
a simple regression test and correlation analysis were performed, and to evaluate any interaction effects 
each level of each independent variable was selected and a simple regression analysis performed.  
 
Results 
Overall, these data generally support previous crisis response strategy identifications, and identify industry, 
crisis type, nation, channel, and time as significantly influencing the selection of crisis response tactics and 
overall strategies. Additionally, time interacted with all four other variables in 37 unique interactions. As a 
result, while main effects for individual independent variables will be reported because the time interaction 
effects were not uniform, analysis at the individual variable-level for those interactions will be reported in 
the industry, crisis type, nation, and channel analyses.  
 
Crisis Response Strategies 
Research Questions one and two asked to what extent were the eight previously identified (see Table 2) 
crisis response strategies verifiable in the new sample and if there were additional strategies emerging from 
these data. Simply stated, the answer to this question is a cautious yes. Three of the previously identified 
strategies emerged in this analysis (see Table 4). Specifically, a present-oriented strategy emerged, where 
the organizations tackled the crises directly talking about the organization our what was occurring in the 
organization with significant positive correlations between routine communication and framing the 
organization (r = .16). An explanative strategy emerged with significant positive correlations between 
framing the crisis and framing the organization (r = .21), accommodative (r = .17), and excellence (r =.14). 
Additionally a defensive strategy emerged with significant positive correlations between framing the 
organization and anti-social or defensive (r = .10), accommodative (r = .08), and interorganizational 
relationships (r = .11). However, a new strategy also emerged from these data—a corrective strategy 
emphasizing an effort to improve the organization’s image by invoking interorganizational relationships and 
showing the organization to be both excellent and responsive to the crisis. This was demonstrated by 
significant positive correlations between accommodative and excellence (r =.18) as well as 
interorganizational relationships (r =.10).  
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Table 4 
Correlations Between Crisis Response Tactics Employed in Crisis Communication Messages 
Crisis Response Strategy1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Self-Enhancement - .-.05 -.25** .03 -.23** -.16** .01 -.08 
2. Routine Communication  - .04 .16** -.04 -.03 .02 -.05 
3. Frame the Crisis   - .21** .03 .17** .14** .07 
4. Frame the Organization    - .1* .08* .08 .11** 
5. Anti-social or Defensive     - -.02 -.09* .06 
6. Accommodative      - .18** .1* 
7. Excellence or Renewal       - -.04 
8. Interorganizational 
Relationships 
       - 
1N = 607 
* = significant at p = .05 level (two-tailed) 
** = significant at p = .01 level (two-tailed) 
 
In order to further evaluate both the strategies emerging as well as the effects of context on their use, a 
factor analysis was performed where factors were extracted using a principal components solution followed 
by a varimax and Kaiser Normalization rotation when multiple factors were observed. Items were included 
if the principle components analysis revealed a .6 or greater: present strategy Eigenvalue of 1.16 
( .28); explanative strategy Eigenvalue of 1.46 ( .40); defensive strategy Eigenvalue of 1.23 
( .24); and corrective strategy of 1.19 ( .15). The factor analysis supported the correlation 
identification of strategies and though the Chronbeck’s alpha scores are low, the most likely impact in their 
application to the independent variables will be that significant differences are more difficult to find.  
 
Industry 
These data show that Hypothesis one was supported. There were significant main effects for industry for 
seven of the eight tactic categories (see Table 3) including: self-enhancement F (4, 607) = 4.56; p = .00; 
routine communication F (4, 607) = 4.47; p = .00; framing the crisis F (4, 607) = 23.33; p =.00; framing 
the organization F (4, 607) = 8.36; p = .00; anti-social or defensive F (4, 606) = 12.91; p = .00; 
accommodative F (4, 607) = 18.56; p = .00; and excellence F (4, 607) = 9.11; p = .00. Additionally main 
effects were found for all four strategies identified above including: present F (4, 607) = 8.01; p = .00; 
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explanative F (4, 607) = 10.31; p = .00; defensive F (4, 607) = 10.54; p = .00; and corrective F (4, 607) = 
9.37; p = .00.  
Further, 16 interaction effects were observed between industry and time. In the automobile industry, time 
affected the use of the accommodative tactic t (149) = 2.23; p =.03 (r = -.18; adjusted R2 = .03) and the 
corrective strategy t (149) = 1.19; p =.05 (r = -.16; adjusted R2 = .02). In the publishing industry, time 
affected the use of framing the organization t (54) = -1.96; p = .05 (r = -.16; adjusted R2 = .05), anti-
social or defensive t (54) = -2.06; p = .05 (r = .27; adjusted R2 = .06), present strategies t (54) = -2.13; p 
= .04 (r = .28; adjusted R2 = .06), defensive strategies t (54) = -3.40; p = .00 (r = .42; adjusted R2 = .16), 
and corrective strategies t (54) =        -2.09; p = .04 (r = .28; adjusted R2 = .06). In the professional 
sports industry, time affected the use of framing the crisis t (275) = 2.26; p = .03 (r = -.14; adjusted R2 
= .02), framing the organization t (275) = 2.21; p = .03 (r = -.14; adjusted R2 = .01), anti-social or 
defensive t (275) = 3.33; p = .00 (r = -.20; adjusted R2 = .04), invoking IORs t (275) = 1.97; p = .05 (r = 
-.12; adjusted R2 = .01), explanative strategies t (275) = 2.69; p = .01 (r = -.16; adjusted R2 = .02), and 
defensive strategies t (275) = 3.07; p = .00 (r = -.18; adjusted R2 = .03). Among humanitarian aid 
organizations, time affected framing the crisis t (106) = -2.69; p = .01 ( r = .25; adjusted R2 = .06), 
excellence t (106) = -3.43; p = .00 (r = .32; adjusted R2 = .09), explanative strategies t (106) =       -2.07; 
p = .04 (r = .20; adjusted R2 = .03), and corrective strategies t (106) = -1.92; p = .05 (r = .18; adjusted 
R2 = .03). Additionally, the Scheffe post hoc analysis revealed significant differences between groups (see 
Table 5).  
 
Table 5 
Scheffe Post Hoc Findings for Industry 
CRS Tactic/ 
Strategy 
Primary Category I Primary Category J M Diff (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
Tactic: Self- 
Enhancement 
Publishing  Professional Sports -.26 .07 .01 
Tactic: Frame 
the Crisis 
Automobile Publishing -.39 .07 .00 
  Humanitarian Aid -.3 .06 .00 
 Publishing Professional Sports .39 .07 .00 
  Entertainment .42 .12 .00 
 Professional Sports Humanitarian Aid .38 .05 .00 
 Humanitarian Aid Entertainment .33 .11 .05 
Tactic: Frame 
Organization 
Automobile Humanitarian Aid -.19 .06 .02 
 Professional Sports Humanitarian Aid -.27 .05 .00 
  Entertainment -.33 .10 .04 
Tactic: Anti-
Social Defensive 
Automobile Professional Sports .12 .03 .02 
 Professional Sports Humanitarian Aid -.12 .04 .04 
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 Entertainment Automobile .38 .08 .00 
  Publishing .37 .09 .00 
  Professional Sports .49 .08 .00 
  Humanitarian Aid .37 .08 .00 
Tactic: 
Accommodative 
Automobile Publishing .29 .06 .00 
  Professional Sports .29 .04 .00 
  Entertainment .27 .09 .05 
 Professional Sports Humanitarian Aid -.18 .04 .00 
Tactic: 
Excellence 
Automobile Publishing .20 .06 .04 
 Humanitarian Aid Automobile .17 .05 .02 
  Publishing .37 .07 .00 
  Professional Sports .21 .05 .00 
Strategy: 
Present 
Professional Sports Humanitarian Aid -.21 .04 .00 
Strategy: 
Explanative 
Professional Sports Automobile -.14 .03 .00 
  Humanitarian Aid -.18 .03 .00 
Strategy: 
Defensive 
Automobile Publishing .12 .04 .05 
 Professional Sports Automobile -.15 .03 .00 
  Humanitarian Aid -.11 .03 .00 
  Entertainment -.08 .06 .05 
Strategy: 
Corrective 
Automobile Publishing .23 .05 .00 
  Professional Sports .15 .03 .00 
 Publishing Humanitarian Aid -.17 .05 .02 
 
 
Crisis Type 
These data demonstrate that crisis type is a significant predictor of crisis response tactics and strategies. 
Main effects were found for six of the eight tactic categories (see Table 3) including: framing the crisis F (2, 
607) = 21.29; p = .00; framing the organization F (2, 607) =11.07; p = .00; anti-social or defensive F (2, 
606) = 5.80; p = .00; accommodative F (2, 607) =39.24; p = .00; excellence F (2, 607) =22.37; p = .00; 
and emphasizing IORs F (2, 606) = 3.89; p = .02. Additionally main effects were found for all four 
strategies identified above including: present F (2, 607) = 10.00; p = .00; explanative F (2, 607) = 20.39; 
p = .00; defensive F (2, 607) = 17.54; p = .00; and corrective F (2, 607) = 25.44; p = .00. Significant 
interaction effects with time and Scheffe post hoc differences are be used to analyze the hypotheses.  
Hypothesis one: organizational transgressions. This hypothesis predicted that organizational 
transgressions will most typically employ tactics that reflect a defensive strategy (i.e., anti-social or 
defensive, accommodative, and framing the crisis). These data directly support this hypothesis. Specifically, 
the Scheffe post hoc results indicated (see Table 6) that organizations facing transgressions were most 
likely to use a defensive strategy, anti-social or defensive and accommodative tactics, and second most 
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likely to use framing the crisis as a tactic. Further, organizations facing transgressions are most likely to 
employ accommodative tactics (M = 1.49, SD = .50) than any other single tactic. However, these data also 
suggested organizations facing transgressions were most likely to use both explanative and corrective 
strategies as well. Additionally, these data indicate that two relationships change with time. Time affected 
the use of accommodative tactics t (75) = 2.41; p = .02 ( r = -.27; adjusted R2 = .06) and present 
strategies t (75) = -2.00; p = .05 (r = .23; adjusted R2 = .04).  
Hypothesis two: organizational events. This hypothesis predicted that organizational events—in these 
data’s case economic downturns—would most typically employ tactics reflecting an explanative and 
offensive strategy (i.e., combining framing the crisis, framing the organization, anti-social or defensive, 
excellence, and IORs). These data partially reject this hypothesis (see Table 6). In the case of economic 
downturns, the low means for framing the organization (M = 1.26, SD = .44), anti-social or defensive (M = 
1.11, SD = .31), accommodative (M = 1.10, SD = .31), excellence (M = 1.14, SD = .35), and employing 
IORs (M = 1.17, SD = .37) indicate these tactics were not commonly used during economic downturns (N 
= 425). Additionally, the means indicate only present (M = 1.28, SD = .34) were substantially used. 
However, because time substantially influenced two tactics—self enhancement t (424) = -2.80; p = .01 (r 
= .14; adjusted R2 = .02) and framing the crisis t (424) = 5.80; p = .00 (r = -.27; adjusted R2 = .07) as 
well as the corrective strategy t (424) = -2.24; p = .03 (r = .11; adjusted R2 = .01) it suggests that the 
adaptations that organizations reacting to economic downturns partially supports the previous research 
with framing the crisis beginning being more substantially used and corrective strategies being 
implemented over time. 
 
Table 6 
Scheffe Post Hoc Findings for Crisis Type 
CRS Tactic/ 
Strategy 
Primary Category I Primary Category J M Diff (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
Tactic: Frame 
the Crisis  
EOO1 OT2 .20 .07 .02 
  OE3 .32 .05 .00 
Tactic: Frame 
Organization 
EOO OT .20 .07 .02 
  OE .23 .05 .00 
Tactic: Anti-
Social Defensive 
OT OE .13 .04 .01 
Tactic: 
Accommodative 
OT OE .38 .04 .00 
 EOO OT -.24 .05 .00 
  OE .15 .04 .00 
Tactic: 
Excellence 
OE OT -.21 .05 .00 
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  EOO -.25 .05 .00 
Tactic: IORs OT EOO .28 .10 .02 
Strategy: 
Present 
OE EOO -.17 .04 .00 
Strategy: 
Explanative 
OE OT -.18 .04 .00 
  EOO -.15 .03 .00 
Strategy: 
Defensive 
OT EOO .09 .04 .05 
 OE OT -.18 .03 .00 
  EOO -.08 .03 .01 
Strategy: 
Corrective 
OT EOO .16 .04 .00 
 OE OT -.25 .04 .00 
  EOO -.10 .03 .01 
1Event Outside Organization’s Control 
2Organizational Transgression 
3Organizational Event 
 
Hypothesis three: events outside the organization’s control. This hypothesis posited that 
organizations facing these crises will most typically employ tactics that reflect an aggressive strategy (i.e., 
anti-social, framing the crisis, and routine communication). In the case of humanitarian aid organizations 
responding to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, this hypothesis is largely rejected. These data indicated that 
humanitarian aid organizations responding to events outside the organization’s control (see Table 6) are 
the most likely of the three types of crises to use tactics that frame the crisis (M = 1.58, SD = .50) , frame 
the organization (M = 1.49. SD = .50), and communicate excellence (M = 1.39, SD = .49). Additionally, 
they are most likely to use a present-oriented strategy (M = 1.45, SD = .39) and likely to use an 
explanative strategy (M = 1.34, SD = .23). Further, time also affects two tactics—framing the crisis t (106) 
= -2.70; p = .01 (r = .25; adjusted R2 = .06) and excellence t (106) = -3.43; p = .00 (r = .32; adjusted R2 
= .09), as well as two strategies—explanative t (106) = -2.07; p = .04 (r = .20; adjusted R2 = .03) and 
corrective t (106) = -2.00; p = .05 (r = .18; adjusted R2 = .03). Together these data indicate that 
organizations responding to events outside the organization’s control do not respond as predicted.  
 
Nation 
These data suggest that the national origin of the organization in crisis is a significant factor affecting 
organizational responses to crises. There was a significant interaction between nation and channel F (9, 
608) = 4.38; p = .05 for present strategies. These data suggest that Germany (M = 1.55, SD = .39) used 
present strategies more than any other nation1; however, in the case of comparing nation and channel, all 
                                                                              
1 US M = 1.30, SD = .36; UK M = 1.26, SD = .31); Canada M = 1.33, SD = .34; Japan M = 1.33, SD = .37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observatorio (OBS*) Journal, (2010)          Audra R Diers, Kathryn Tomaino 
 
041
 
nations except Canada used the present strategy more often in new media compared to traditional media 
environments.  
There were significant main effects for seven tactics including: self-enhancement F (4, 607) = 22.77; p = 
.00, routine communication F (4, 607) = 9.00; p = .00, framing the crisis F (4, 607) = 15.66; p = .00, anti-
social or defensive F (4, 606) = 18.29; p = .00, excellence F (4, 607) = 4.58; p = .00, and invoking IORs F 
(4, 607) = 4.05; p = .00. Additionally, there were significant main effects for the remaining three 
strategies—explanative F (4, 607) = 18.90; p = .00, defensive F (4, 607) = 19.99; p = .00, and corrective 
F (4, 607) = 15.87; p = .00.  
Further, eight interaction effects between the nation and time were observed with five of them being from 
US-based organizations. Changes in the US crisis response with time included three tactics—self-
enhancement t (350) = -3.39; p = .00 (r = .18; adjusted R2 = .03), framing the crisis t (350) = 6.45; p = 
.00 (r = -.33; adjusted R2 = .10), and excellence t (-2.09); p = .04 (r = .11; adjusted R2 = .01). Neither 
the UK nor Canada demonstrated significant interaction effects. There were two tactics changes in 
Germany’s crisis response including self-enhancement t (44) = 1.99; p = .05 (r = -.29; adjusted R2 = .06) 
and excellence t (44) = 2.06; p = .05 (r = -.30; adjusted R2 = .07). Additionally, there was only one 
change in Japanese crisis response—accommodative tactics reduced over time t (62) = 2.89; = .01 (r = -
.35; adjusted R2 = .11).  
Additionally, Scheffe post hoc tests reveal significant differences between individual nations (see Table 7). 
Specifically, the US differed from three of the four other nations substantially—only the US and Canada had 
no significant differences in their tactics or strategies. The US differed from the UK on four tactics and two 
strategies. The US used self-enhancement tactics more often than the UK; however, the UK used framing 
the crisis, anti-social or defensive and accommodative tactics all more often as well as employing 
explanative and defensive strategies more often. Germany used routine communication and anti-social or 
defensive tactics as well as explanative and defensive strategies more often that the US. Finally, the US and 
Japan differed substantially with Japan using three tactics and three strategies significantly more often than 
the US including: framing the crisis, accommodative, and invoking interorganizational relationships as well 
as explanative, defensive, and corrective strategies.  
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Table 7 
Scheffe Post Hoc Findings for Nation 
Tactic/ Strategy Primary Category I Primary Category J M Diff (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 
Tactic: Self- 
Enhancement 
UK US -.44 .05 .00 
  Germany -.42 .08 .00 
  Japan -.33 .07 .00 
Tactic: Routine 
Communication 
Germany US .34 .07 .00 
  UK .47 .08 .00 
  Canada .39 .13 .05 
  Japan .29 .09 .04 
Tactic: Frame 
the Crisis 
US UK -.35 .05 .00 
  Japan -.19 .06 .04 
Tactic: Anti-
Social Defensive 
US UK -.26 .03 .00 
  Germany -.22 .05 .00 
Tactic: 
Accommodative 
Japan US .5 .04 .00 
  UK .29 .05 .00 
  Canada .41 .09 .00 
  Germany .46 .07 .00 
Tactic: 
Excellence 
Japan UK .22 .06 .02 
  Canada .37 .11 .02 
Tactic: 
Emphasizing 
IORs 
Japan US .32 .09 .02 
Strategy: 
Explanative 
US UK -.18 .03 .00 
  Germany -.14 .04 .04 
  Japan -.25 .04 .00 
Strategy: 
Defensive 
US UK -.16 .03 .00 
  Germany -.16 .04 .00 
  Japan -.24 .03 .00 
Strategy: 
Corrective 
Japan US .31 .04 .00 
  UK .23 .04 .00 
  Canada .30 .08 .01 
  Germany .24 .06 .00 
 
The UK and Canada differed on no tactics or strategies. However, the UK used substantially fewer self-
enhancement and routine communication tactics than Germany. Additionally, Japan used more self-
enhancement, accommodative, and excellence tactics and were more likely to use a corrective strategy 
than the UK. In addition to those already mentioned, Germany used routine communication tactics more 
often than Japan, but Japan was more likely to use accommodative tactics and corrective strategies more 
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often. Therefore, these data strongly support hypothesis five that the organizations nation of origin will 
affect its approach to crisis response.  
 
Channel 
These data suggest that channel does affect crisis response strategy, but only in approximately half of the 
tactics and strategies indicating strong partial support for hypothesis six. Specifically, these data indicate 
main effects for channel on three tactics and two strategies including: anti-social or defensive F (1, 608) = 
11.46; p = .00, accommodative F (1, 608) = 15.02; p = .00, excellence F (1, 608) = 5.23; p = .02 tactics 
as well as the explanative F (1, 608) = 5.20; p = .02 and defensive F (1, 608) = 10.20; p = .00 strategies. 
This is, of course, in addition to the previously discussed interaction between channel and nation for the 
present strategy. These data indicate that organizations use traditional media for more assertive messages 
with substantially more instances of anti-social or defensive (traditional M = 1.22, SD = .42; new media M 
= 1.11, SD = .31) and accommodative (traditional M = 1.29, SD = .46; new media  M = 1.15, SD = .35) 
tactics as well as explanative (traditional M = 1.30, SD = .41; new media M = 1.23, SD = .25) and 
defensive (traditional M = 1.26, SD = .39; new media M = 1.18, SD = .21) strategies. Yet, organizations 
used the new media channels to most typically communicate about the excellence of the organization and 
its work (new media M = 1.24, SD = . 43; traditional M = 1.11, SD = .32).  
Additionally, there were three interaction effects between channel and time. In traditional media sources, 
framing the crisis reduced over time t (134) = 2.92; p = .00 (r = -.25; adjusted R2 = .05). In new media 
sources two additional tactics changed with time—self-enhancement t (472) = -2.22; p = .03 (r = .10; 
adjusted R2 = .01) and framing the crisis t (472) =3.60; p = .00 (r = -.16; adjusted R2 = .03). Therefore, 
while channel does not make as large of an impact as other variables, it is still a substantial factor offering 
a strong partial confirmation of hypothesis 6.  
 
Time 
Hypothesis seven predicted that over the time of a crisis, crisis response strategies would be likely to evolve 
and change. As previous results indicate, this hypothesis is supported; however, the relatively small effect 
sizes indicate that future research should work to identify additional co-variates. In addition to the 
interaction effects, these data indicate that time is affects three tactics and one strategy as main effects. 
This hypothesis was tested with a series of simple regressions indicating that the tactics of self-
enhancement t (606) = -2.65; p = .00, adj. R2 = .01, framing the crisis t (606) = 4.72; p = .00, adj. R2 = 
.03, and excellence t (606) = -2.03; p = .00, adj. R2 = .01 as well as the corrective strategy t (606) = -
2.06; p = .00, adj. R2 = .01 were affected by time. These resulted in positive correlations with self-
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enhancement (r = .11) and excellence (r = .08) tactics as well as the corrective strategy (r = .08); 
however, a negative correlation with the framing the crisis tactic (r = -.19) suggesting that organizations 
are more likely to use self-enhancement and excellence tactics along with the corrective strategy as the 
crisis progresses, but less likely to frame the crisis with time.  
 
Discussion 
This research has somewhat problematized but also clarified previous findings, but more importantly 
identified some of the most productive paths forward to building a more robust understanding of crisis 
response. This research highlights two of the key lessons learned in crisis communication from Hurricane 
Katrina: (a) because relationships between organizations and their stakeholders are not static, we can 
expect both new threats and new opportunities and (b) we must view organizations and the environment 
integratively—the more we try to analyze real-world situations, the more we will understand them (Cowen 
& Cowen, 2010). Yet, the consistencies between Diers (2009) and the present research suggests that 
useful “lists” of crisis response strategies applying across contexts can emerge and we should continue to 
develop, test, revise, and analyze evidence-based lists—preferring them to analytical lists. Therefore, this 
section will summarize key findings and contributions as well as identify limitations and directions for future 
research based on: time, industry, crisis type, nations, channels, and crisis response strategies.  
 
Time 
We begin with time because this factor that most affected the results of this study reaching its influence 
across all other factors. Additionally, this method of addressing time within the context of on-going crises is 
also a departure from the way in which time is often depicted in crisis communication research. Typical 
conceptualizations of time focus on pre-crisis (e.g., prevention), an communication intervention during a 
crisis, post-crisis clean up (e.g., assigning blame), and image recovery (Malone & Coombs, 2009). The 
strength of these findings across an 8-week study of crises suggests that while there is some truth in the 
association of image recovery with later in crises, these categorical descriptions of the effect of time on 
crisis response strategies are likely too reductionist. Yet, the relatively small effect sizes for time suggest 
that future research ought to also identify the factors that, together with time, most influence 
organizational crisis response.  
Overall, there were several trends in the influence of time on crisis responses—that while positive or image-
recovery types of tactics and strategies developed over time (i.e., self-enhancement, excellence, and 
corrective were predominantly positively correlated with time), so too did others like present-oriented and 
defensive strategies. What was, however, consistent was that response strategies over time became more 
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rich and complex with many of the strategies emerging as significant as crises developed. These findings 
are more in line with practitioner recommendations and analysis about the need for early rapid responses—
giving facts and setting a clear tone about the organization (e.g., framing the crisis and accommodative 
tactics both were used more early rather than late) and then developing that information as the crisis 
continues (Carr, 2010; Neary, 2010) than many academics’ analysis about the phases of crisis development 
(e.g., Gonzales-Herrero & Pratt, 1996; Malone & Coombs, 2009). Additionally, time interacted with industry 
and crisis the most—approximately 25 percent of the time compared to nation and channel—interacting 
approximately 13 percent of the time.  
One of the limitations in this study was that some of the crises had just begun, some had been on-going, 
and some (e.g., those in the entertainment industry) were simply too short. This suggests that while future 
research ought to include time as—at the very least—a covariate if not the object of study, it should 
probably be tested in a more consistent sample in the future.  
 
Industry 
Overall, industry was identified as a more substantial factor in this study than previous ones supporting 
more general analysis that industries would influence crisis response strategies (e.g., Arpan, 2002; 
deBrooks & Waymer, 2009; Glynn, 2000; Millar, 2004). Across four of the industries analyzed there were 
strong findings, yet more research should be developed on each and expand this research to address other 
industries.  
The automobile (manufacturing) industry has seen serious challenges in the last several years ranging from 
the economic downturn to a seemingly unending set of substantial recalls. The manufacturers included in 
this study included both primary crisis situations and the findings were consistent with previous 
manufacturing findings (Diers, 2009) with the use of the defensive strategy. However, the automobile 
industry employed a rich set of strategies with evidence of all four strategies strongly emerging. There are 
two ways to understand these findings—the first supports Cowen and Cowen’s (2010) lessons learned after 
Hurricane Katrina that organizations are embedded in multiple communities and those relationships (as well 
as the communication needed to maintain or repair them) should be viewed as integrated—in short, we 
should expect a rich number of strategies and tactics from the industry. The alternative explanation is that 
automobile manufacturers are similar to nine of ten organizations facing economic downturns—they fail to 
strategically plan (Anonymous, 2010) and so use a kitchen sink approach to responding to crises. At this 
point, it is not clear which might be the case; however, this is certainly an area for future research.  
Similarly, the publishing industry has been hard-hit by the economic downturn and the simultaneous 
proliferation of new media, and in this case it seems more clear that they are a part of that 90 percent of 
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organizations that have failed to strategically plan for the economic downturn (Anonymous, 2010). This is 
evident because as the situations we analyzed developed, the publishers continued to develop their 
responses implementing present, defensive, and corrective responses as time progressed. PR practitioner 
Patrick Kinney argued (Neary, 2010) that while the first moments of a crisis are critical, if those first 
responses to a crisis are not effective, we should see evidence of substantial strategy development over 
time. This certainly seems to be the case in the publishing industry.  
Humanitarian aid organizations—like the other two developed their message complexity with time. Early in 
the crisis, these organizations emphasized present and defensive strategies, which make sense as they are 
trying to educate stakeholders about the situation, develop donations and support, and minimize any 
negative information that might come out about aid or relief efforts. Later in the crisis, these organizations 
developed explanative and corrective strategies seemingly to paint their work in the crisis as open, 
engaged, and celebrating their successes. This strategic development supports previous research indicating 
that because of the challenging nature of natural disasters, nonprofit organizations often have to improvise 
their messages (Broz, et al., 2009).  
Finally, the professional sports organizations that we examined were unique—in comparison to the other 
industries. While the other industries broadened their responses during the crisis, professional sports 
narrowed theirs. These organizations began with defensive and explanative strategies emphasizing tactics 
that framed the crisis, framed the organization, were anti-social or defensive, and invoked 
interorganizational relationships and then narrowed to essentially a single-tactic strategy at the end using 
self-enhancement nearly exclusively. Their use of self-enhancement did not change with time; it merely 
was the one remaining over the data-collection period. These were sports organizations in different sports, 
different sex players, different countries, and even different relative “status” of the sports (English Premier 
League Soccer versus the Women’s National Basketball Association). There is not a clear reason evident in 
this analysis and there is a dearth of research on sports organizations and crisis communication to explain 
this difference from the other industries. Certainly, more research needs to be conducted analyzing crisis 
response in the sports industry.  
 
Crisis Type 
This study’s investigation of crisis type yielded significant differences between transgressions, events or 
economic downturns, and events outside the organizations control or natural disasters. These data did not 
entirely behave as predicted; yet, we believe there are good explanations for these disparate findings. 
Initially, organizational transgressions behaved as predicted—in fact, these data more accurately reflected 
previous research (e.g., Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Hearit, 1999; Pearson & Clair, 1998) than did Diers 
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(2009) research with clear evidence of not only defensive strategies, but also image-oriented strategies. 
This suggests that crises are probably best studied over time—something the cross-sectional design with a 
random sampling of “early”, “middle”, and “late” of Diers (2009) did not accomplish—indicating that a 
longitudinal and cross-sectional design is probably the best design.  
The findings for Organizational Events were most interesting because all of the organizations (N = 7 of 11) 
were experiencing economic downturns. These organizations crossed national and industry lines making the 
findings likely to be robust. For these organizations facing economic downturns, the principle strategy 
implemented was present-oriented with an emphasis on framing the organization and routine 
communication (e.g., basic marketing, annual reports, newsletters, etc.). This strategy represents an 
almost “business as usual” or “Wait, what crisis?” approach for organizations facing serious financial 
troubles like the Portsmouth FC that had weeks of not paying its players and being hundreds of millions of 
dollars in debt with a risk of being disbanded, or General Motors having gone through a bankruptcy and 
restructuring with the US Federal Government as its majority stockholder, or the publishing industry, which 
is at critical risk of failing altogether. Aside from being a seemingly ‘tone-deaf’ economic decline strategy 
strongly supports the findings from the survey indicating that most organizations facing economic decline 
have failed to strategically prepare for the situation (Anonymous, 2000). However, there is a positive side—
the development of the corrective strategy in these situations over time suggests these organizations are 
trying to adapt. The question for future research will be whether these later adaptations renew the 
organizations and lead to positive outcomes for organizations struggling since the 2008 global “financial 
crisis”.  
Finally, the two organizations followed to analyze the Events Outside the Organization’s Control were also 
unlike most organizations facing these kinds of events because they were humanitarian aid organizations 
responding to the earthquake that devastated Haiti in January, 2010. Unlike, for example, the airline 
industry affected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States or even the 2010 
Iceland volcanic eruptions, the humanitarian aid organizations’ “business” increases with the unforeseen 
events and their performance in responding to them is the source of their public image. Therefore, it makes 
sense that present and defensive strategies are used early to address the crisis and set themselves up as 
positively as possible with the corrective and explanative strategies coming later to celebrate successes.  
Superficially, it seems as though these data have problematized previous research on the influence of crisis 
type on crisis response strategies; however, these data more clearly demonstrate that when dealing with 
“average” or more typical types of crises that previous research effectively predicted these crises 
responses. However, we are confronting a different world and different types of crises and our research 
must adapt to them.  
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Nation 
Though research in the last couple of years has emphasized the importance of studying crisis 
communication across cultures and national boundaries (Bodkin, Amato, & Peters, 2009; Carroll, 2009; 
Chen, 2009 710; de Brooks & Waymer, 2009), there has been little genuinely cross-national scholarship in 
crisis communication. Additionally, much of the theory building in crisis communication has been based in 
American case studies (Argenti, 2002; William L. Benoit & Czerwinski; Coombs, 2007; Coombs & Schmidt, 
2000 611; Fishman, 1999 435; Heath & Millar, 2004 661; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Sellnow & Brand, 2001; 
Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). These data strongly suggest that our focus on American organizations and single-
nation case studies should change.  
Findings of note included, first, that US-based organizations most changed their tactics and strategies with 
time reducing the application of framing the crisis and adding self-enhancing and excellence tactics with 
defensive and corrective strategies. The only other nation-based changes were negative representing a 
reduction of tactics with German and Japanese-based companies removing tactics. Overall, these data 
indicated that the US differed from most nations in the tactics and strategies used.  
Second, the German-owned company analyzed—Porsche—was dominated by a present-oriented strategy, 
so much that unlike the other automobile manufacturers over the course of the crisis it nearly eliminated its 
use of image-based tactics. Third, the Japanese company analyzed—Toyota—was dominated by pro-social 
tactics and strategies focusing on accommodation (though that decreased with time), self-enhancement, 
excellence, and corrective strategies. This is not surprising given that the crisis was the Toyota recalls; 
however, it too deviated from the automobile industry profile. In both of these cases, it would be easy to 
argue that nation was not a primary influence—that situation or industry would dictate the responses. 
However, these two organizations were obviously within the same industry and yet varied from each other 
substantially and Toyota’s focus on pro-social tactics and strategies also ran counter to the defensive 
strategy, which was the dominant one for organizational transgressions. This, plus the lack of interactions 
between these variables suggests that a culture-based explanation more appropriately reflects these 
findings, which is consistent with Chen’s (2009) analysis of public relations across regions and Rovisco’s 
(2010) findings on different nations’ narratives and symbols surrounding events.  
Taken together, these findings suggest US is not the ‘box standard’ for crisis response and theory building. 
However, this research is only a first examination of cross-national crisis response strategies and future 
research should not just do more single-nation case studies—instead we should increase the number of 
comparisons in order to verify these findings and other single-nation findings as well as challenge common 
assumptions about how crisis communication works.  
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Channels 
Whereas the other variables saw substantial findings, channels was the weakest of the independent 
variables suggesting that crisis communication and public relations is able to translate its core messages, 
no matter the medium. However, there are some findings of note. Initially, over time, we found that in 
both traditional and new media the use of framing the crisis reduced suggesting this strategic consistency 
we mentioned; however, we saw an increase in the use of self-enhancement in new media only over time.  
More interestingly, where there were differences between traditional and new media, we only saw positive 
or pro-social messages being communicated in new media with a focus on self-enhancement with time and 
excellence tactics. However, in traditional media outlets, there was a mixture of message strategies pairing 
explanative and defensive tactics. This suggests that media framing may have much to do with these 
differences. Using new media (e.g., press releases, blogging, twitter, etc.), organizations have absolute 
control of their message. However, in traditional media, organizations rely on journalists for the selection of 
statements disseminated. Future research should definitely address framing biases in crisis responses to 
better analyze this finding.  
 
Conclusion 
In the end, did the previous heuristics stand up against new crises, a longitudinal design, and new types of 
organizations? We argue a cautious yes—though we revised and added to previous findings (see Table 8) 
with this research, the content categories remained intact. Additionally, the content categories (i.e., 
strategies) identified here reflected correlations between tactics coded by neutral researchers indicating 
that we can, in fact, effectively begin to make lists of strategies born from research-based analysis of the 
tactics. Additionally, by replicating and broadening Diers (2009) research, we confirmed three new factors’ 
impact on crisis response messages and concretely identified an image-based strategy that she previously 
suggested a trend towards seeing, but simply did not have the data to support. 
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Table 8 
Revision to Crisis Response Message Strategies 
Strategy Definition Tactics Included Predictors of Strategy 
Present-Oriented CRSs emphasize tackling the 
crisis directly—talking about 
the organization’s role and/or 
actions taken 
Framing the Crisis, 
Framing the 
Organization1,2, Anti-
Social/Defensive, 
Accommodative, IOR’s, 
Routine Communication 
Non-Crisis Prone Organizations, 
Publishing Industry (later in crisis), 
Automobile, Humanitarian Aid, 
Entertainment, OT3’s (later in 
crisis), EOO, OE, US, UK, Canada, 
Germany, Japan, Traditional 
Media, New Media 
Defensive CRSs emphasize denying or 
minimizing the organization’s 
culpability or role, but also 
actively involves efforts to 
increase organization’s image 
Anti-Social/ 
Defensive, 
Accommodative, 
Framing the 
Organization, IORs 
Manufacturing Industry, 
Administrative Support & Waste 
Remediation Industry, Publishing 
(later in crisis), Professional Sports 
(early in crisis), Automobile, 
Humanitarian Aid, Entertainment, 
OT, EOO, US (later is crisis), US, 
UK, Canada, Germany, Japan, 
Traditional Media 
Explanative CRSs endeavor to create good 
will while explaining the 
crisis—characterized by 
openness, engagement, and 
an appearance that the 
organization is sympathetic to 
the situation 
Framing the Crisis, 
Accommodative, 
Framing the 
Organization, Excellence 
Accommodation Industry, Finance/ 
Insurance, Professional Sports 
(early in crisis), Humanitarian (late 
in crisis) Automobile, Publishing, 
Entertainment, OE,  OT, EOO 
(later in crisis), UK, Canada, 
Germany, Japan, Traditional, New 
Media 
Corrective CRSs endeavor to emphasize 
the work the organization is 
doing to address the crisis—
characterized by appeals to a 
positive organizational image, 
even borrowing from partner 
organizations’ image 
Accommodative, 
Excellence, IORs 
Automobile (early in crisis), 
Publishing (late in crisis), 
Humanitarian Aid (late in crisis), 
OT, OE (later in crisis) EOO (later 
in crisis), US (later in crisis), UK, 
Germany, Japan, Traditional Media 
1Tactics and Factors found in this study are italicized 
2Tactics and Factors found in Diers (2009) and this study italicized and bolded 
2OT = Organizational Transgression, OE = Organizational Event, EOO = Event Outside the Organization’s 
Control 
 
Yet, more than anything else, this study demonstrates that verifiable and testable strategies will emerge 
from samples if we engage in the research to identify them and that those strategies are substantially 
influenced by time, industry, crisis type, nation, and channel. So, JFK’s sentiment about crises—that they 
are simultaneously dangerous and opportunities is true for both organizations and researchers. For 
researchers, this research demonstrates that despite a couple of decades of case studies and analytical 
connections between tactics, connecting them to stakeholders and outcomes that we are still merely 
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treading in largely unchartered international waters. The contexts in which we must understand, predict, 
and practice crisis response are only going to become more complex and we must respond.   
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